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The Role of Leadership in Salespeople’s Price Negotiation Behavior 
 
 
Abstract 
Salespeople assume a key role in defending firms’ price levels in price negotiations with 
customers. The degree to which salespeople defend prices should critically depend upon their 
leaders’ influence. However, the influence of leadership on salespeople’s price defense behavior 
is barely understood, conceptually or empirically. Therefore, building on social learning theory, 
the authors propose that salespeople might adopt their leaders’ price defense behavior given a 
transformational leadership style. Furthermore, drawing on the contingency leadership 
perspective, the authors argue that this adoption fundamentally depends on three variables 
deduced from the motivation–ability–opportunity (MAO) framework, that is, salespeople’s 
learning motivation, negotiation efficacy, and perceived customer lenience. Results of a multi-
level model using data from 92 salespeople and 264 salesperson–customer interactions confirm 
these predictions. The first to explore contingencies of salespeople’s adoption of their 
transformational leaders’ price negotiation behaviors, this study extends marketing theory and 
provides actionable guidance to practitioners. 
 
Keywords: sales, leadership, price negotiations, salesperson–customer interaction, 
transformational leadership, social learning
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In many industries, the salesforce plays a key role in defending firms’ price levels. In fact, price 
defense is—ceteris paribus—the sales task with the most immediate and strongest financial 
impact; in the short term, an additional average discount of 1% decreases a company’s profit by 
11% (Marn, Roegner, and Zawada 2004). Given the potential impact of price defense on profit, a 
common, long-standing concern of managers is that salespeople may grant discounts too easily 
(Joseph 2001): almost 40% of sales managers think that their salesforce “needs improvement” in 
its ability to avoid discounting (CSO Insights 2011) and “avoiding discounting” is among the top 
five metrics used to measure the performance of and sales managers (CSO Insights 2014).  
Given practitioners’ interest in this topic, marketing researchers have put an increasing 
emphasis on understanding the phenomenon of salespeople’s discounting or price defense. We 
define the intensity of salesperson price defense behavior as a salesperson’s effort invested in a 
price negotiation to refute a customer’s discount demand (Hüffmeier et al. 2014). For instance, if 
intensity of price defense is high, a salesperson may invest great effort in explaining to a 
customer why a specific price is justified, and he may not easily concede a discount to the 
customer. Conversely, if intensity of price defense is low, the salesperson may not counter a 
customer’s discount claim with much effort, but willingly comply with the customer’s request.  
Marketing researchers have studied both consequences and determinants of salespeople’s 
price defense behavior. As to the first, researchers have revealed ambivalent consequences of 
price defense behavior: while defending prices increases the margin of a successful transaction, it 
may also induce customers to refrain from purchasing products they would have purchased 
otherwise or weaken customer relationships (e.g., Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Ganesan 1993; 
Weitz 1981; Wieseke, Alavi, and Habel 2014). In total, whether salespeople’s price defense 
behavior is beneficial or harmful to firms’ overall financial performance may be subject to 
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various contingencies, such as either a differentiation or cost-based firm strategy (e.g., Slater and 
Olson 2000), customer attributions of why he or she received a discount (e.g., Darke and Dahl 
2003), customers’ price sensitivity (e.g., Wieseke, Alavi, and Habel 2014), and salespeople’s 
customer-oriented behaviors (e.g., Alavi, Wieseke, and Guba 2016).  
Second, researchers have helped companies understand the management levers that 
determine salespeople’s price defense behavior—hereby refraining from the normative question 
of whether price defense should or should not be fostered (see Figure 1 for a summary literature 
overview). For example, works in this stream of literature have found that the intensity of 
salespeople’s price defense is influenced by the firm’s incentive scheme (e.g., Joseph 2001; Lal 
1986; Weinberg 1975, 1978), the degree to which salespeople are authorized to negotiate prices 
(e.g., Bhardwaj 2001; Homburg, Jensen, and Hahn 2012; Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier 1979; 
Wilken et al. 2010), the provision of cost information to salespeople (e.g., Wilken et al. 2010), as 
well as specific salespeople skills and behaviors (e.g., Alavi, Wieseke, and Guba 2016; Wieseke, 
Alavi, and Habel 2014). 
Interestingly, regarding determinants of salespeople’s price defense behavior, to our best 
knowledge, no works exist that examine how superiors’ leadership affects salespeople’s price 
defense behavior (see Figure 1: Research void 1). We regard addressing this research void as 
important from both an academic and a managerial perspective. First, academics have argued 
that leadership is a key factor influencing salespeople’s behavior (e.g., Boichuk et al. 2014; 
Dubinsky et al. 1995; MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Rich 2001; Martin and Bush 2006; 
Panagopoulos and Avlonitis 2010; Schmitz and Ganesan 2014; Shannahan, Bush, and 
Shannahan 2013). It thus seems likely that a superior’s leadership also assumes a prominent role 
in increasing or decreasing salespeople’s price defense behavior. If this is the case, examining 
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this role is pertinent to contribute to a thorough academic understanding of the phenomenon of 
salespeople’s price defense behavior. Therefore, the unique contribution of this paper to explore 
the interplay of leaders’ role and salespeople’s characteristics on salespeople’s price defense. 
Second, if practitioners intend to increase salespeople’s price defense behavior, doing so through 
leadership represents a cost-efficient alternative to other, more costly approaches, such as the 
adjustment of the incentive scheme. Therefore, investigating the impact of leadership on 
salespeople’s price defense behavior may not only expand knowledge on determinants of 
salespeople’s price defense behavior, but may likewise provide valuable guidance to managerial 
practice. 
----- Please insert Figure 1 about here ----- 
Building on these notions, the goal of our study is to provide insights into the impact of 
leadership on salespeople’s intensity of price defense behavior.1 We deduce our hypotheses from 
social learning theory (Bandura 1971) and the contingency leadership perspective (Den Hartog 
and Belschak 2012). First, drawing on social learning theory, prior literature finds evidence that 
salespeople are likely to adopt their leaders’ attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Chakrabarty, Brown, 
and Widing 2013; Lam, Kraus, and Ahearne 2010), particularly if leaders are transformational 
(e.g., Mullins and Syam 2014; Rich 1997; Wieseke et al. 2009, 2011; see bottom of Figure 1 as 
well as Table 1 for details). Drawing on these notions, we deduce from social learning theory 
that the degree to which salespeople defend prices may depend on sales leaders’ role modeling, 
that is, the degree to which sales leaders defend prices themselves. Second, and in addition, we 
propose that this effect is particularly pronounced if leaders exhibit transformational leadership. 
                                                          
1 Following prior works in this literature stream, we do not take a normative stance on the question whether 
salespeople should or should not grant discounts to customers. Instead, our work is of explicative nature and aims to 
improve our understanding of the factors that factually drive salespeople’s price defense. 
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Hereby, transformational leadership is defined as a leader’s exhibition of idealized influence, 
arousing of inspirational motivation, provision of intellectual stimulation, and treatment of 
followers with individualized consideration (Avolio, Bass, and Jung 1999).  
Second, importantly, while we expect to find the aforementioned effects on average, they 
are unlikely to occur imperatively. Specifically, the contingency leadership perspective (e.g., 
Den Hartog and Belschak 2012; Fiedler 1978; Li et al. 2013; Yun, Cox, and Sims 2006) suggests 
that the effect of leaders’ behavior on their followers also depends on followers’ characteristics 
(see also Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995). This is also true for the sales context, where exchanges 
between sales manager and salespeople are dyadic in nature, depending on specific leader and 
salesperson characteristics (e.g., Schwepker 2017; Ahearne, Mathieu, and Rapp 2005). However, 
strikingly, with few notable exceptions (e.g., Shannahan, Bush, and Shannahan 2013), the 
interplay between sales leaders’ transformational leadership and salesperson-related variables 
has remained unexplored so far, also in the context of price negotiations (see Figure 1: Research 
void 2). To provide an accurate and valid account of the effects of a leader’s behavior on a 
salesperson’s price defense behavior, we thus argue that salespeople’s characteristics need to be 
necessarily included in our research model. Therefore, to contribute to knowledge on the 
contingency leadership perspective in sales, we deduce such salesperson characteristics from the 
motivation–ability–opportunity (MAO) framework, which is a well-established theoretical basis 
for explaining human behavior (Siemsen, Roth, and Balasubramanian 2008) and has recently 
been applied to sales settings (Schmitz 2013). 
----- Please insert Table 1 about here ----- 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a field study in the automotive retailing context. 
Based on a dataset comprising three data sources, that is, a survey of 92 salespeople matched to 
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264 interaction-specific responses of these salespeople and their customers, we ran a multi-level 
path model to assess the interactive effects of leaders’ intensity of price defense, leaders’ 
transformational leadership style, and salespeople’s characteristics. Results fully corroborate our 
theoretical predictions. We find that the transfer of leaders’ price defense behavior to 
salespeople’s price defense behavior does not occur unconditionally but strongly hinges on the 
extent of leaders’ transformational leadership style. Moreover, this positive effect of 
transformational sales leaders’ on salespeople’s price defense depends on salespeople 
contingency factors delineated from the MAO framework (specifically, salespeople’s learning 
motivation, salespeople’s negotiation efficacy, and salespeople’s perceived customer negotiation 
lenience). 
Our study makes at least three contributions to sales and marketing research. First, our 
study is the first to reveal that sales leadership strongly influences salespeople’s intensity of price 
defense, thus providing insight into this important research void (see Figure 1). Specifically, as 
deduced from literature on salespeople’s adoption of their leaders’ behaviors (e.g., Lam, Kraus, 
and Ahearne 2010; Mullins and Syam 2014; Wieseke et al. 2009, 2011) and empirically shown 
in our study, salespeople tend to adopt their leaders’ intensity of price defense, especially if 
leaders are transformational. Second, significantly extending prior literature, our study caters to 
calls for research on contingencies of the efficacy of leadership behavior (e.g., Avolio 2007; 
Hunter, Bedell-Avers, and Mumford 2007; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, and Bommer 1996). 
Specifically, we clarify that leaders’ role modeling of price defense behavior in combination with 
transformational leadership is not sufficient to ensure all salespeople’s price defense behavior. 
Instead, in the context of price negotiations, the effectiveness of role modeling in combination 
with transformational leadership strongly hinges on salespeople’s learning motivation, 
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salespeople’s negotiation efficacy, and salespeople’s perceived customer negotiation lenience. 
Conceptualizing and empirically validating these contingencies significantly contributes to 
marketing research since they cannot be deduced from prior empirical studies on salespeople’s 
adoption of their leaders’ role modeling. Instead, we theoretically deduced these contingencies 
for the context of price negotiations by combining social learning theory with the MAO 
framework. 
Third, we contribute to negotiation literature. In a recent comprehensive review of the 
negotiation literature, Herbst, Voeth, and Meister (2011) demand an enhanced focus on holistic 
price negotiation models accounting for organizational influences on salespeople’s bargaining 
behavior. We address these omissions in previous research by exploring the intricate role of 
leaders in price negotiations among salespeople and customers. 
Moreover, our findings have actionable implications for sales leaders in price 
negotiation–intense contexts. Most importantly, sales leaders need to be aware that their own 
negotiation behavior and leadership style likely influences their salespeople’s price defense 
behavior. Notably, this influence is unlikely to be homogeneous for all salespeople, but may 
strongly depend on an individual salesperson’s learning motivation, negotiation efficacy, and 
perceived customer lenience. Thus, if sales leaders intend to alter their followers’ negotiation 
behavior, they may (a) carefully adjust their own negotiation behavior and leadership style to 
each salesperson, or (b) aim at influencing their salespeople’s learning motivation and 
negotiation efficacy to match their own negotiation behavior and leadership style. 
 
Conceptual framework and hypotheses development 
In the following, we describe our conceptual framework and derive corresponding hypotheses. 
Figure 2 summarizes our conceptual framework, and the measurement table in the Appendix 
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provides precise definitions and measurement levels for all constructs employed in the 
framework. Using a social learning lens (Bandura 1977) and the contingency perspective on 
leadership (e.g., Yun, Cox, and Sims 2006; Fiedler 1978), our conceptual model posits the 
following: (1) The interpersonal influence process by which leaders affect salespeople’s price 
defense behaviors rests on role modeling, i.e., salespeople’s imitation of their leaders’ price 
defense behavior. (2) This effect interacts with the leader’s transformational leadership style, 
reinforcing the role modeling effect. Finally, (3) the combined effect of role modeling and 
transformational leadership style is augmented by situational factors rooted in the MAO 
framework, i.e., salespeople’s learning motivation, perceived negotiation efficacy, and 
perceptions about customers’ negotiation lenience. In what follows, we present our hypotheses 
development starting with the main effect of leaders’ on salespeople’s intensity of price defense 
(H1). 
----- Please insert Figure 2 about here ----- 
Social learning theory: leaders’ influence on salespeople price defense through role 
modeling 
Research suggests that role modeling is an effective means for sales leaders to influence their 
salespeople’s behavior (Lam, Kraus, and Ahearne 2010; Wieseke et al. 2009). Rich (1997) 
defines role modeling as a “behavior on part of the sales manager perceived by the salesperson as 
appropriate to follow that is consistent with both the values the sales manager espouses and the 
goals of the organization” (Rich 1997, p. 320). The reason for salespeople to adopt leaders’ 
behavior is rooted in social learning theory (Bandura 1969a, 1969b, 1971). Social learning theory 
posits that individuals may acquire new behaviors by observing and imitating others. Social 
learning theory has been previously applied to the sales context and proved useful to understand 
8 
 
sales leader–salesperson relationships (see Table 1 for an overview of respective literature). For 
instance, salespeople have been found to imitate their managers’ technology acceptance behavior 
(Homburg, Wieseke, and Kühnl 2010), market orientation (Lam, Kraus, and Ahearne 2010), 
work motivation (Wieseke et al. 2011), psychological climate (Martin and Bush 2006), and even 
adopt their leaders’ organizational identification (Wieseke et al. 2009). 
However, a core tenet of social learning theory is that individuals do not automatically 
and naively adopt observed behaviors but instead evaluate the consequences of the observed 
behavior (Bandura 1977), which is referred to as vicarious reinforcement (Bandura 1977). 
Importantly, individuals tend to imitate behaviors that they observed if they expect the 
consequences of these behaviors to be rewarding for them. As Conger and Kanungo (1987, p. 
642) put it, employees adopt their leader’s behavior that they deem “worthy of imitation.” 
Applied to the salesforce context, we propose that salespeople may hold particularly high 
reward expectations for adopting their sales leaders’ behavior and are thus likely to follow their 
leaders’ example (Rich 1997). Adopting their sales leaders’ behavior should be perceived as 
rewarding by salespeople because sales leaders occupy a “position of power and legitimacy in 
the sales organization” (Mathieu, Ahearne, and Taylor 2007, p. 530). If sales leaders exhibit a 
specific behavior, it may signal to salespeople that adopting this behavior is useful to achieve 
success in the sales organization (Mathieu, Ahearne, and Taylor 2007).  
This reasoning should specifically apply to salespeople’s adoption of their sales leaders’ 
price defense behavior. Salespeople’s price defense behavior should be particularly susceptible 
to sales leader influences because in the task environment of price negotiations, salespeople are 
confronted with various conflicting interests of the firm, the customer, and themselves (Alavi, 
Wieseke, and Guba 2016; Ganesan 1993). These conflicting demands in the realm of price 
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negotiations can trigger salespeople’s uncertainty and consecutively their need for guidance 
(House 1996). Consequently, the sales leader as an experienced role model may prove a valuable 
source of orientation for salespeople regarding the intensity of price defense behavior they 
should exhibit. Specifically, salespeople should expect imitating their leaders’ intensity of price 
defense as rewarding because salespeople should perceive it as conducive to their own 
negotiation performance. Based on this reasoning, we hypothesize that: 
H1: Salespeople’s perceptions of their leaders’ intensity of price defense behavior is positively  
related to salespeople’s intensity of price defense behavior. 
 
 
Impact of transformational leadership on salespeople’s adoption of leader price defense 
behaviors 
Among the potential role models to choose from, attractive models capture a learner’s attention 
(Brown and Treviño 2014). Transformational leaders are typically perceived as more attractive 
by followers and imitating their behavior as more rewarding for salespeople (Wieseke et al. 
2011; Piccolo and Colquitt 2006; Martin and Bush 2006; Rich 1997). Transformational 
leadership in the sales context implies showing individual consideration for salespeople, 
intellectually stimulating as well as motivating them, and communicating a compelling vision for 
the organization (Shannahan, Bush, and Shannahan 2013; MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Rich 
2001). Seeing these facets of transformational leadership, transformational sales leader have 
been found to develop high quality relationships with salespeople in the sense of leader–member 
exchange theory (Schwepker 2017; Piccolo and Colquitt 2006; Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995). In 
this respect, prior research clarified that these facets of transformational leadership considerably 
improve salespeople’s perceptions of their managers in different areas (Martin and Bush 2006): 
transformational sales leaders build closer relationships with salespeople (Smith, Andras, and 
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Rosenbloom 2012), are perceived as more trustworthy, are more respected, and perceived as 
more competent (Shannahan, Shannahan, and Bush 2013; Antonakis, Fenley, and Liechti 2011; 
MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Rich 2001). 
Seeing their strong standing with their salespeople and eligibility as role models, 
transformational leadership should enhance salespeople’s adoption of their leaders’ behaviors. 
That is, salespeople should expect particularly high rewards from imitating a transformational 
leader’s behavior as this leader is perceived as especially able and competent (Antonakis, Fenley, 
and Liechti 2011; Martin and Bush 2006; Mackenzie, Podsakoff, and Rich 2001). If such a well-
respected transformational leader exhibits high intensity of price defense behavior, salespeople 
may infer that this behavior is increasing negotiation performance, and thus be inclined to adopt 
it. Conversely, salespeople might view a sales leader low in transformational leadership as a less 
convincing role model. Thus, they might view adopting his price defense behavior as less 
rewarding and refrain from adopting it. Hence: 
H2: The positive impact of leaders’ intensity of price defense behavior on salespeople’s intensity  
of price defense behavior is more pronounced if salespeople perceive leaders as 
transformational. 
 
 
The key role of salespeople’s motivation, ability, and opportunity  
When considering the moderating effect of transformational leadership on the role modeling 
process, it has to be noted that “more attention needs to be given to the followers of 
transformational leadership” (Bass and Riggio, 2006, p. 235; Piccolo and Colquitt 2006). In fact, 
the contingency leadership perspective proposes that the impact of leaders’ behaviors and style 
on followers should fundamentally depend upon a number of follower characteristics (e.g., Yun, 
Cox, and Sims 2006; Fiedler 1978). Consistent with this perspective, in choosing such 
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contingencies for our model, we draw on the motivation–ability–opportunity (MAO) framework, 
which is a well-established theoretical basis for explaining human behavior (Siemsen, Roth, and 
Balasubramanian 2008) and has recently been applied to sales settings (Schmitz 2013). Our 
rationale for drawing on the MAO framework is that a salesperson’s motivation, ability, and 
opportunity are well-established, comprehensive predictors of salespeople’s behavior (e.g., 
Schmitz 2013). The behavior we aim to elucidate is a salesperson’s adoption of his or her 
leader’s intensity of price defense. Thus, we expect a salesperson to adopt a leader’s price 
defense behavior more strongly if the salesperson is motivated, able, and perceives an 
opportunity to emulate his leader’s price defense behavior.  
Therefore, and in accordance with our social learning lens, for developing the hypotheses 
for the moderating effects we will focus on the role of MAO variables in salespeople’s social 
learning processes. More specifically, we posit that the effect of transformational leaders’ role 
modeling on salespeople’s adoption of price defense behaviors will increase when (1) the 
salesperson is motivated to learn (H3), (2) the salesperson exhibits a high negotiation efficacy 
(H4), and (3) the salesperson perceives a customer to be lenient in a price negotiation (H5).  
 
Salespeople’s learning motivation Salespeople exhibiting a high level of learning motivation 
are highly motivated to continuously improve their abilities and view sales experiences as an 
opportunity to receive feedback for their further personal development (Sujan, Weitz, and Kumar 
1994). Thus, such salespeople are likely to scan their work environment for learning 
opportunities and seek inputs for effective behaviors in the selling context. In this respect, 
Boichuk et al. (2014, p. 97) emphasized that transformational leadership contributes to the 
creation of a “guided learning environment” in which leaders give salespeople a clear road map 
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and provide them with meaningful examples. Therefore, transformational sales leaders represent 
a natural source of guidance and orientation for salespeople willing to learn (Ingram et al. 2005). 
That is, highly learning-oriented salespeople should view adopting transformational leaders’ 
behaviors as particularly useful to achieve their learning goals. 
With regard to price negotiations, learning-oriented salespeople aim at improving their 
negotiation behavior. Learning the appropriate intensity of price defense behavior is especially 
important for salespeople because it may determine the outcome of a negotiation. To learn which 
intensity of price defense behavior to exhibit vis-à-vis customers, salespeople should be 
particularly likely to observe the intensity of price defense behaviors of their leaders, especially 
if leaders are transformational. Salespeople should expect adopting transformational sales 
leaders’ intensity of price defense behavior as highly rewarding and useful because these leaders 
emanate an aura of competence, suggesting to salespeople that their price negotiation behavior is 
bound to be effective. Thus, they should be particularly open and sensitive to transformational 
leaders’ role-modeling influence. Therefore, we hypothesize the following: 
H3: The joint effect of the intensity of leader price defense and transformational leadership style  
on intensity of salesperson price defense is more positive if the salesperson’s learning 
motivation is high. 
 
 
Salespeople’s negotiation efficacy Perceived negotiation efficacy refers to salespeople’s 
strength of belief in their own ability to affect the outcome of a price negotiation through their 
negotiation behavior (Kim, Pinkley, and Fragale 2005). Consequently, salespeople’s negotiation 
efficacy tends to reflect the extent to which they perceive their negotiation performance to be 
under their own control compared with being driven by external circumstances (Mathieu, 
Ahearne, and Taylor 2007; Den Hartog and Belschak 2012). In what follows, we present our 
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reasoning why salespeople are more likely to adopt transformational sales leaders’ price defense 
behavior if they exhibit high negotiation efficacy. 
Efficacy beliefs increase individuals’ ability to learn effectively (Zimmerman 2000). 
Specifically, efficacy beliefs increase the use of self-regulatory processes while learning, such as 
goal setting, self-monitoring, and self-evaluation (e.g., Zimmerman and Bandura 1994; 
Zimmerman, Bandura, and Martinez-Pons 1992). In addition, efficacy beliefs reduce stress and 
anxiety while learning (e.g., Bandura 1997; Pajares and Kranzler 1995). This allows individuals 
to learn with higher effort and persistence, increasing their learning success (e.g., Multon, 
Brown, and Lent 1991; Salomon 1984; Schunk 1981). 
Building on these findings, we expect that salespeople who exhibit high negotiation 
efficacy are more likely to socially learn negotiation behavior. Specifically, as outlined above, 
these salespeople may exhibit increased self-regulation as well as decreased stress while learning 
how to negotiate from their social environment, which should allow them to learn with increased 
effort, persistence, and thus success. In our context, social learning pertains to salespeople’s 
adoption of their leaders’ intensity of price defense (see H1), which we argued to be particularly 
pronounced if leaders are transformational (see H2). Thus, putting these pieces together, we 
expect the positive effect of transformational sales leaders’ on salespeople’s intensity of price 
defense behavior to be augmented for high perceived negotiation efficacy owing to its catalyzing 
effect on social learning.2 In support of this reasoning, Pieterse et al. (2009) stated that the role 
modeling influence of transformational leaders should be enhanced when followers’ 
                                                          
2 An alternative hypothesis may be that a salesperson whose negotiation efficacy is low may imitate a leader’s price 
defense in search for orientation and improvement. However, if negotiation efficacy is low, the salesperson may try 
to learn with lower self-regulation and higher stress, which decreases learning success (Zimmerman 2000). Thus, we 
expect the net moderating effect of negotiation efficacy to be positive. 
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psychological empowerment is high, i.e., when followers feel more able to proactively influence 
their work role and environment. Thus:  
H4: The joint effect of the intensity of leader price defense and transformational leadership style  
on intensity of salesperson price defense is more positive if the salesperson’s negotiation 
efficacy is high.  
 
 
Salespeople’s perceived customer negotiation lenience Perceived customer negotiation 
lenience reflects the extent to which a salesperson perceives a customer as yielding and docile in 
a price negotiation (Perdue and Summers 1991). For instance, a customer high in negotiation 
lenience might make little or no discount demands and might not be a tough, persistent 
negotiator. Consequently, salespeople’s perceived customer negotiation lenience is a situational 
factor, specific to each customer–salesperson interaction, and hence represents the opportunity 
facet in the MAO framework. Two reasons suggest that salespeople are more likely to adopt 
transformational sales leaders’ price defense behavior in price negotiations where they perceive 
high customer negotiation lenience. First, negotiating with customers who are not lenient but 
tough negotiators is difficult, putting high cognitive load on salespeople. Such cognitive load 
may in turn impede salespeople’s ability to retrieve and exhibit socially learned information in a 
given negotiation (Kirschner 2002; Sweller 1994; Van Merrienboer and Sweller 2005). Thus, in 
negotiations with tough customers, salespeople may be less likely to follow their 
transformational leaders’ role modeling of price defense. Conversely, if customers are lenient 
negotiators, salespeople may have access to cognitive resources that allow them to retrieve and 
imitate their leaders’ intensity of price defense. 
Second, salespeople who negotiate with a tough customer face a trade-off between 
defending the price and securing the deal (Alexander, Schul, and Babakus 1991; Weingart et al. 
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1990; Wieseke, Alavi, and Habel 2014). To navigate this trade-off, salespeople may have to 
adapt their behavior flexibly to the specific negotiation situation (e.g., Alavi, Wieseke, and Guba 
2016; Spiro and Weitz 1990). As a result, even if they are able to access socially learned 
negotiation behavior, it may be difficult for salespeople to follow their transformational leaders’ 
intensity of price defense as proposed in H1 and H2. Conversely, if customers are lenient 
negotiators, salespeople may adopt their leaders’ intensity of price defense free from situational 
constraints.  
In summary, we argue that if salespeople perceive customers to be lenient, they are more 
likely to adopt their leaders’ intensity of price defense. We hypothesize: 
H5: The joint effect of the intensity of leader price defense and transformational leadership style  
on intensity of salesperson price defense is more positive if the salesperson’s perception of 
customers’ negotiation lenience is high. 
 
Methodology 
Data collection and sample 
Context description Particularly in negotiation research, investigators have raised concerns 
concerning the generalizability of results obtained in laboratory settings (Alavi, Wieseke, and 
Guba 2016; Evans and Beltramini 1987; Zetik and Stuhlmacher 2002). Therefore, we decided to 
conduct our study in a field setting and collected dyadic data from salesperson–customer 
interactions in a B2C automobile retailing context. We chose the context of automobile retailing 
because discount negotiations regularly occur when customers purchase cars (Consumer Reports 
2016), which is an essential requirement given the research question our study aims to answer. 
Moreover, salespeople are frequently exposed to their leaders’ price defense behavior in joint 
negotiations or in coaching sessions and can thus readily observe it (Brett, Friedman, and Behfar 
2009; Deeter-Schmelz and Ramsey 1995). 
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To initiate the cooperation with automobile dealerships, we conducted discussions with 
the top management of several dealership chains within one region of Germany. Obtaining full 
top management commitment and support for our study was essential because our study design 
required thorough participation of salespeople and their customers in the dealerships and the 
presence of our data collection team in the dealership facilities over several weeks. Top 
managements of three dealership chains were willing to support our study and allow our research 
team to visit and stay at their dealerships. Importantly, all 28 dealerships of the chains including 
all salespeople were obliged to participate in our study. The automobile dealership chains 
represented two mainstream car brands with a very similar price positioning and product 
portfolio. Moreover, negotiation policies were highly similar across those dealerships chains.  
In the initial meetings with the top managements of the dealership chains, one of our key 
goals was to discuss the dealerships’ business practices to gain an understanding of the context 
and be able to evaluate whether the context is compatible with our research goals. In this respect, 
we particularly focused on salespeople’s compensation schemes and dealerships’ negotiation 
policies as they constitute important influences on salespeople–customer price negotiations (e.g., 
Homburg, Jensen, and Hahn 2012; Joseph 2001). Discussions with the top managements of the 
dealership chains revealed that their compensation schemes and negotiation policies were highly 
prototypical for the automobile retailing industry in Germany and eligible to investigate our 
research question. In the following, we describe these compensation schemes and negotiation 
policies in detail. 
Regarding salespeople’s compensation schemes, a substantial variation in compensation 
schemes across dealerships and across individual salespeople was prevalent for the dealership 
chains. This is because compensation schemes did not only depend on management policy, but 
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also on individual arrangements with salespeople. The standard method of compensation for 
each salesperson was a bonus per car sold and a sales commission. Additionally, salespeople 
received a bonus tied to the profit of a sold car. Moreover, they received a bonus for selling of 
financing contracts. On average the share of variable compensation of the total compensation 
was approximately 70%. Seeing the variance of compensation schemes on the salesperson level, 
we included control variables for each of these facets of the salesperson compensation scheme in 
our model. Incentives specifically focusing on preventing discounts were not in place.  
Regarding negotiation policies, all salespeople in the dealerships were granted full pricing 
authority for discounts up to 20%. When salespeople intended or were asked by customers to give 
a discount exceeding 20% of the list price, they were obliged to consult with their supervisor 
(which occurred only three times during our data collection). 
 
Data collection procedure and sources Each salesperson completed a questionnaire providing 
general perceptions and attitudes concerning his or her job and supervisor. Additionally, we 
obtained data from salespeople and their customers directly after sales encounters with the help 
of questionnaires, which our research team personally administered to salespeople and customers 
to achieve the best possible response rates and to ensure accurate matching. Importantly, there 
was a time lag of one month between the initial salesperson survey (t=1 in Figure 2), which 
captured the independent variables, and the subsequent interaction-specific customer and 
salesperson surveys (t=2 in Figure 2), which captured salespeople’s perceived customer 
negotiation lenience and the dependent variables. We introduced this time lag to mitigate 
common method issues and reduce the likelihood of reversed causation. The questionnaires 
referred to the car that was the major subject of the sales interaction.  
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After approximately 30 weeks of data collection (on average, we spent one week at each 
dealership), we had obtained 264 salesperson–customer interactions. In this process, 92 
salespeople and 264 customers participated in the survey, with a mean of 2.9 interactions 
recorded per salesperson. In total, 39 sales leaders were in charge of the dealerships resulting in 
an average control span of 2.3 salespeople per leader.  
The response rate for salespeople was 100% because participation was obligatory, and the 
response rate for customers was approximately 45%. More precisely, in total, we contacted 587 
customers of which 264 responded. For customers who did not agree to participate, we did not 
collect the salesperson t=2 survey either, since we aimed for complete dyadic information in our 
data set. The average age of salespeople was 34.8 years with a median of 35 and a standard 
deviation of 10.9, and the average job experience was 11.7 years (SD = 8.8), ranging between 0 
and 44 years. The customers had a mean age of 43.4 with a median of 43 (SD = 14.13). 
To avoid biasing the results by only observing successful sales encounters, we collected 
data on both discount negotiations which were closed with a sale (45.3% of the interactions) and 
interactions in which no agreement was reached (54.7% of the interactions). However, all 
interactions ended with a final sales price the salesperson offered to the customer. 
 
Measures 
Measurement level and sources We used measurements established in the marketing literature, 
with adjustments to suit the study’s context. The Appendix provides a full list of items employed 
in this study. In what follows, we indicate the data sources of our core constructs. In the 
salesperson survey in t=1, salespeople indicated the variables leader’s transformational 
leadership, intensity of leader price defense, salesperson’s learning motivation, and salesperson’s 
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perceived negotiation efficacy. We decided to measure and model salespeople’s perceptions of 
their leaders’ transformational leadership style and intensity of price defense on the salesperson 
level (t =1) on the basis of the contingency leadership perspective (Fiedler 1978) and leader-
member exchange theory (Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995). As Sin, Nahrgang, and Morgeson (2009, 
p. 1048) put it: “research on supervisor–subordinate relationships has shown convincingly that 
leaders do not behave consistently toward all subordinates.” Accordingly, to account for 
potential variance in salespeople’s perceptions of their leaders, we model salespeople’s 
perceptions of leader behaviors on the salesperson level (level 2). However, as a robustness 
check, we verify our results aggregating these variables on the leader level (level 3; see 
robustness check section). 
On the customer–salesperson interaction level (level 1, in t=2), intensity of salesperson 
price defense, salesperson’s perceived customer negotiation lenience, and realized discount 
(discount granted to the customer, measured in % of the list price) was provided by the 
salesperson for each specific sales conversation with the customer. 
 
Measurement diagnostics To assess construct reliability, we inspected Cronbach’s alpha and 
conducted a confirmatory factor analysis. Regarding Cronbach’s alpha, all multi-item scales used 
in the study passed the recommended threshold value of .7 with the exception of the control 
variables salesperson intrinsic motivation and empowerment (Nunnally 1978). Regarding the 
confirmatory factor analysis, we initially assessed the overall fit of the measurement model 
before verifying the reliability of individual constructs on the basis of individual item 
reliabilities, composite reliability (CR) and average variance extracted (AVE). The overall fit of 
the measurement model was satisfactory (CFI = .97, TLI = .96, RMSEA = .04, SRMR = .05). 
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Concerning the reliability diagnostics for the individual multi-item constructs, we report 
Cronbach’s alpha, CR, and AVEs in Table 2 and all factor loadings (ʎ) in the Appendix. Apart 
from the control variable salesperson intrinsic motivation, all constructs conform to prescribed 
thresholds for AVE and CR indicating sufficient reliability and convergent validity (Bagozzi and 
Yi 1988). Eventually, to assess discriminant validity of the constructs employed in our study we 
relied on the criterion of Fornell and Larcker (1981). According to this criterion a construct is 
discriminant from another construct if the construct’s AVE is larger than the squared correlation 
of both constructs. All constructs passed this test. 
 
Non-response bias test In our study customers who participated in our study could have 
systematically varied from customers who declined to participate. Thus, to check whether such a 
selection or nonresponse bias might confound the results of the data analysis, we inspected 
whether responses from participants systematically differed from responses of non-participants. 
We employed special incentives (coupons for a discount on car maintenance) and a very short 
version of the questionnaire to collect data from customers who originally did not intend to 
participate. We then compared responses from participants with responses from non-participants 
with regard to critical customer variables (age, gender, customer satisfaction, purchase intention, 
realized discount; see Web Appendix 1). The results show that the groups do not differ 
systematically regarding these variables. Thus, a non-response bias is unlikely to be an issue for 
the sample. 
--- Please insert Table 2 about here --- 
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Model specification  
Our study comprises 264 customer–salesperson interactions that are nested in 92 salespeople. 
Because several interactions are matched to a single salesperson, the observations in the dataset 
are not independent from one another, which is a basic assumption of the ordinary least squares 
estimator. When this assumption is violated, coefficients have been found to be biased (Hox 
2010). Hence, to account for the nested data structure, we employ a multilevel approach that 
allows the simultaneous processing of data from multiple levels. Specifically, we ran a two-level 
path model as specified in Figure 2 using Mplus 7 and a full information maximum likelihood 
estimator. Thus, salesperson data is modeled at level 2 and interaction-specific data of 
salespeople (i.e., the intensity of salesperson price defense behavior, salespeople’s perceived 
customer negotiation lenience, and realized discount) are modeled at level 1. Moreover, as a 
robustness check, we estimated a three-level model comprising leadership variables on level 3, 
which we discuss in more detail in the robustness check section. 
To assess whether a multilevel approach is factually required, we inspected intraclass 
correlation coefficients (ICC), which indicate the proportion of variance that resides between the 
groups (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Simulation studies show that a multilevel approach is 
warranted when ICCs exceed .05 to .15 (Hox 2010). In our study, the ICCs substantially exceed 
the recommended thresholds, providing evidence that a multilevel approach is required, and are 
comparable to similar studies in sales management (Hughes and Ahearne 2010; ICCintensity of 
salesperson price defense = .36; ICCrealized discount = .19). Given these ICCs, we conducted a multilevel 
regression model (Hox 2010; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Before running the model, we 
centered all predictor variables on their grand means to reduce multicollinearity issues and 
facilitate the interpretation of interaction effects (Hofmann and Gavin 1998). In our hypotheses 
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development, we predicted three-way interactions between leader behavior, leadership style and 
salesperson factors derived from the MAO framework. For salespeople’s learning motivation and 
negotiation efficacy, we specified the three-way interactions in the model at the between level 
while the three-way interaction with salespeople’s perceived customer negotiation lenience is 
specified as a cross-level interaction (see equations in Web Appendix 2). 
Moreover, based on prior research on price negotiation and leadership, we included 
several control variables in the model. Specifically, at level 1 we added customers’ perceived 
price importance, customer–salesperson length of relationship (Alavi, Wieseke, and Guba 2016), 
a car type dummy (used vs. new) and customers’ alternative demand concession. The latter is 
included to account for the possibility that customers might demand non-monetary concessions 
or better conditions for trade-in vehicles. At level 2, we included an array of control variables 
potentially influencing salespeople’s price defense behavior to verify the stability of our focal 
leader-related effects. Specifically, we included variables capturing salespeople’s prevalent and 
theoretically established dimensions of compensation schemes (Zenger and Marshall 2000; share 
of fixed compensation, share of sales commission of total variable compensation, importance of 
achieving profit goals). Moreover, we included control variables accounting for salespeople’s 
task characteristics on the basis of Hackman and Oldham’s job characteristics model (1975) such 
as salesperson job identification, job experience, autonomy, perceived competitive intensity, and 
leader contingent reward and punishment for task achievement (i.e., providing positive and 
negative feedback on performance) (Schmitz and Ganesan 2014) (see details on the scales in the 
Appendix). 
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Results 
Main results The estimation of the multi-level path model largely corroborates the predictions 
of our theoretical framework (see Table 3). More precisely, the main effect of intensity of leader 
price defense on intensity of salesperson price defense which we postulated in H1 is confirmed 
(Main Effects Model: b = .47, p < .01). Furthermore, our prediction based on social learning 
theory presented in H2 that the positive relationship between intensity of leader and salesperson 
price defense should be enhanced for high levels of transformational leadership is confirmed 
(Two-way Interactions Model: b = .14, p < .05). 
Regarding the three-way interactions, in H3, we suggested that the intensity of leader 
price defense increases the intensity of salesperson price defense if the leader exhibits a 
transformational leadership style and the salesperson possesses a strong learning motivation. The 
positive coefficient of the three-way interaction term provides support for H3 (Full Model with 
Controls: b = .16, p < .05). Moreover, interaction diagram A in Figure 3 illustrates the pattern of 
results and further confirms our prediction in H3 (see Web Appendix 3 for a detailed discussion). 
In H4, we argued that the intensity of leader price defense increases the intensity of 
salesperson price defense if the leader exhibits a transformational leadership style and the 
salesperson possesses a high negotiation efficacy. The positive coefficient of the three-way 
interaction term provides support for H4 (Full Model with Controls: b = .11, p < .05). Moreover, 
interaction diagram B in Figure 3 illustrates the pattern of results and further confirms our 
prediction in H4 (see Web Appendix 3 for a detailed discussion).  
Eventually, in H5, we argued that the intensity of leader price defense increases the 
intensity of salesperson price defense if the leader exhibits a transformational leadership style 
and salespeople perceive the customer as lenient in the price negotiation. The positive coefficient 
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of the three-way interaction term provides support for H5 (Full Model with Controls: b = .04, p < 
.05). Moreover, interaction diagram C in Figure 3 illustrates the pattern of results and further 
confirms our prediction in H5 (see Web Appendix 3 for a detailed discussion). Eventually, as 
expected, the intensity of salesperson intensity of price defense behavior exhibits a significant 
negative effect on customers’ realized discount in the price negotiation (Full Model with 
Controls: b = -.06, p < .05). 
--- Please insert Table 3 about here --- 
--- Please insert Figure 3 about here --- 
Robustness checks We conducted four robustness checks to verify the validity of our findings. 
First, in the main model estimations we employed a two-level path model with salespeople 
variables from t=1 residing at level 2 and customer and salespeople interaction-specific variables 
at t=2 residing at level 1. Since salespeople are nested within sales leaders, it might be necessary 
to account for the leader level, extending the two-level to a three-level model. In particular, for 
the variables leader’s transformational leadership and intensity of leader price defense, it might 
be argued that these variables should reside at the leader level (level 3) as they pertain to leaders’ 
behaviors. To account for potential dependence among salespeople owing to being supervised by 
the same sales leader, we estimated a three-level path model, comprising a leader level (level 3), 
a salesperson level (level 2), and a customer–salesperson interaction level (level 1). For this 
purpose, we aggregated salespeople’s responses on their leaders’ transformational leadership and 
intensity of price defense per leader and included it as a level 3 variable while all other variables 
are modelled as in the main analysis. Results of this three-level path model estimation 
corroborate findings from our two-level analysis (please refer to Table 3) indicating that the 
measurement level of the leader variables does not unduly influence our results.  
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Second, we calculated variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the full model to assess 
whether results of the model execution are unduly influenced by correlations among the 
independent variables. Prior research suggests that multi-collinearity among independent 
variables in a regression model can be tolerated if VIFs do not exceed a threshold value of 5 
(Menard 1995). In the model, the VIFs of all independent variables fall below this threshold 
value (VIFmin = 1.08, VIFmean = 1.83, VIFmax = 3.32). Based on this analysis, we conclude that 
correlations among the independent variables do not unduly influence our results.  
Third, following a procedure recommended by Ganzach (1997), to account for the 
potential influence of non-linear predictors and correlations among predictors, we ran the full 
model and additionally included quadratic terms of the main independent variables. Results 
remain fully stable for this extended model. That is, the three-way interactions pertaining to 
salesperson’s learning motivation (b = .13, p < .10), salesperson’s negotiation efficacy (b = .10, p 
< .05), and salesperson’s perceived customer negotiation lenience (b = 0.4, p < .05) are all 
significantly positive while the quadratic terms are nonsignificant. This indicates that our 
findings are not unduly confounded by correlations among the predictors or by non-linearity. 
Fourth, as indicated previously, 54.7% of interactions did not result in a sale. It may well 
be that the lack of success in these interactions was caused by a salesperson’s exaggerated price 
defense. If this were the case, greater price defense may have been disadvantageous, because 
making a discounted sale may still create more value for a dealership than not making a sale at 
all. To test this issue, we examined the average intensity of salesperson price defense for 
interactions that did and that did not result in a sale. Intensity of salesperson price defense did not 
differ significantly across these two group (p > .10). Thus, it is unlikely that the success or failure 
of an interaction was decisively driven by a salesperson’s price defense. 
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Fifth, to further verify our previous argument, we additionally investigated the effect of 
intensity of salesperson price defense on customers’ purchase intention. We replicated our main 
model (Table 3, Full Model) additionally including customer purchase intention as an ultimate 
dependent variable. In this estimation, results show an insignificant main effect of intensity of 
salesperson price defense behavior on customer’s purchase intention (b = -.03, p > .84; see Web 
Appendix 4 for the full model estimation). Consequently, salespeople’s price defense behavior 
on average seems to reduce realized discounts, but does not necessarily deter customers from 
purchasing the product.  
While the findings of our previous robustness checks may seem surprising at a first 
glance, an explanation might be that a salesperson’s price defense only decreases a customer’s 
purchase intention under certain circumstances. For instance, key contingencies may be a 
salesperson’s communication skills to effectively deploy price defense behaviors without 
deterring customers (Blanchard, Carlson, and Hyodo 2016; Kwon and Weingart 2004) and a 
customer’s level of trust (Schurr and Ozanne 1985). Furthermore, the importance that customers 
attribute to receiving price discounts represents a further key contingency which is known to 
strongly vary between different customers (e.g., Wieseke, Alavi, and Habel 2014). This 
reasoning is likewise supported by an additional robustness check in Web Appendix 5, which 
shows that intensity of salesperson price defense is also unrelated with a salesperson’s objective 
annual sales. 
 
Discussion 
Summary of findings 
Results of our empirical analysis fully corroborate our theoretical predictions based on social 
learning theory, the contingency perspective of leadership, and the MAO framework. We find 
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that the transfer of leaders’ price defense behavior to salespeople’s price defense behavior does 
not occur unconditionally, but rather strongly hinges on the extent of leaders’ transformational 
leadership style and, importantly, on the variables delineated from the MAO framework. 
Specifically, results show that leaders constitute particularly viable role models for salespeople’s 
price defense behavior if leaders exhibit a transformational leadership style and salespeople 
possess a high learning motivation, negotiation efficacy, or perceive that customers exhibit high 
negotiation lenience.  
 
Research issues 
Our study contributes to academic research in at least three ways. First, we provide first insight 
into the research void of how sales leadership influences salespeople’s price defense behavior. 
Notably, prior research has already examined various management techniques that influence 
salespeople’s price defense behavior, such as incentivization (e.g., Joseph 2001; Lal 1986; 
Weinberg 1975, 1978) and delegation of pricing authority to salespeople (e.g., Bhardwaj 2001; 
Homburg, Jensen, and Hahn 2012; Wilken et al. 2010). However, the omission of leadership 
variables in prior research limited academic knowledge on the phenomenon of salespeople’s 
price defense and neglected a potentially important lever that is easily actionable for 
practitioners. In addressing this omission, our study also confirms that findings of prior literature 
on salespeople’s adoption of leaders’ behaviors hold for the price negotiation context. More 
specifically, as Table 1 illustrated, prior research has established that certain sales leader 
behaviors and attitudes are socially learned by salespeople, such as market orientation (Lam, 
Kraus, and Ahearne 2010), adaptive selling (Chakrabarty, Brown, and Widing 2013), and 
organizational identification (Wieseke et al. 2009)—especially if leaders are transformational 
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(Mullins and Syam 2014; Wieseke et al. 2009, 2011). We add to this literature by showing that 
such social learning also pertains to behavior in price negotiations, and by confirming that 
transformational leadership may act as a catalyst in this respect.  
Admittedly, the aforementioned findings merely transfer an established mechanism 
(social learning catalyzed through transformational leadership) to a new context (price 
negotiations). However, our second and unique contribution is the conceptualization and 
empirical confirmation of the fundamental moderating influence of salespeople characteristics 
(see H3 through H4). Specifically, a key tenet of prior sales leadership research centers on the 
notion that role modeling and transformational leadership alone are sufficient to inspire 
employees to imitate leaders (e.g., Mullins and Syam 2014; Rich 1997; Wieseke et al. 2009, 
2011). However, this perspective has been questioned by the contingency leadership perspective 
and leader–member exchange theory, which suggest that the effect of leaders’ behavior on their 
followers also depends on followers’ characteristics (e.g., Den Hartog and Belschak 2012; 
Fiedler 1978; Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995; Li et al. 2013; Yun, Cox, and Sims 2006; see also 
Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995). For example, Podsakoff, MacKenzie, and Bommer (1996) noted that 
transformational leaders’ impact on followers’ behaviors needs to be appropriately specified and 
contextualized, and Hunter, Bedell-Avers, and Mumford (2007, p. 439) emphasized a “lack of 
examining potential moderators” in the analysis of the consequences of transformational 
leadership on followers (see also Avolio 2007).  
To address the dearth of research on contingencies of sales leadership in leader–member 
exchanges, we deduced a set of salesperson characteristics (learning motivation, negotiation 
efficacy, perceived customer lenience) from the MAO framework that in the context of price 
negotiations affects the degree to which leaders’ role modeling and transformational leadership 
29 
 
induces salespeople’s adoption of leaders’ price defense behaviors. Conceptualizing and 
empirically validating these contingencies significantly contributes to marketing research since 
they cannot be deduced from prior empirical studies on salespeople’s adoption of their leaders’ 
role modeling. Instead, we theoretically deduced these contingencies for the context of price 
negotiations by combining social learning theory with the MAO framework.  
Our findings bear implications for leadership research on role modeling in sales contexts 
because respective works might not only focus on the leadership style but must take into account 
its interplay with salespeople’s characteristics. Specifically, as our findings illustrate, salespeople 
endowed with different characteristics might perceive and react to leader behaviors in different 
ways, corroborating the contingency leadership perspective and leader–member exchange theory 
(e.g., Den Hartog and Belschak 2012; Fiedler 1978; Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995; Li et al. 2013; 
Yun, Cox, and Sims 2006). Omitting to include such fundamental contingencies in research on 
sales leader–salesperson dyads may lead to overly simplified or even erroneous conclusions 
(Grewal et al. 2013). We hold that future research should carve out further mechanisms and 
contingencies that determine how sales leaders can steer salespeople’s negotiation behavior. Two 
directions seem particularly worthwhile in our view. First, it might be interesting to examine 
which leader influence tactic is most effective for different types of salespeople to facilitate 
salespeople’s adoption of leaders’ price defense behavior (Furst and Cable 2008). Second, future 
research may delve deeper into the role of leaders’ contingent rewards (e.g., MacKenzie, 
Podsakoff, and Rich 2001), which has been found to positively affect leader–member exchange 
(e.g., Wayne et al. 2002). While we controlled for rewards both in terms of leaders’ leadership 
style and salespeople’s incentive structure, it may be interesting to examine how such rewards 
facilitate salespeople’s social learning of price defense behaviors. For example, certain types of 
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contingent rewards may positively affect salespeople’s learning motivation, which as our study 
indicated acts as a catalyst of social learning. 
Third, our study contributes to negotiation literature. In a recent comprehensive review of 
the negotiation literature, Herbst, Voeth, and Meister (2011) demanded an enhanced focus on 
holistic price negotiation models to account for organizational influences on salespeople’s 
bargaining behavior. Thus, to date, the role of sales leaders in price negotiations and how sales 
leaders affect salespeople’s negotiation performance is not well understood. We addressed this 
omission in previous research by exploring the role of sales leaders in price negotiations among 
salespeople and customers and thus integrated two major previously disparate research areas that 
are naturally related. Therefore, our study conceptually and empirically carves out the pivotal 
influence of sales leaders on salespeople’ negotiation behavior and performance. 
 
Managerial implications 
Approximately 70% of companies delegate some extent of pricing authority to their salesforce 
(Lim and Ham 2014; Hansen, Joseph, and Krafft 2008; Frenzen et al. 2010). Seeing this 
influence of salespeople on their companies’ price setting, managers are often concerned with 
ensuring their salespeople’s price defense behaviors (Joseph 2001). As mentioned previously, 
almost 40% of sales managers think that their salesforce “needs improvement” in its ability to 
avoid discounting (CSO Insights 2011) and “avoiding discounting” is among the top five metrics 
used to measure the performance of and sales managers (CSO Insights 2014). Interestingly, our 
study shows that it is sales managers themselves whose behavior strongly influences their 
salespeople’s price defense. Notably, this influence is unlikely to be homogeneous for all 
salespeople, but may strongly depend on an individual salesperson’s learning motivation, 
31 
 
negotiation efficacy, and perceived customer lenience. In this respect, at least three major 
conclusions can be drawn from our study. 
First, when willing to stimulate price defense, leaders are recommended to display 
consistent price defense behavior to set appropriate examples to their teams, and to adopt a 
transformational leadership style. This is particularly important if salespeople are highly 
motivated to learn and are able and endowed with the opportunity to defend prices vis-à-vis 
customers. Our findings suggest that in this case, salespeople are particularly likely to internalize 
their leaders’ price defense. To this end, firms can ensure high levels of leaders’ price defense 
intensity through installing appropriate incentive systems and internal marketing measures to 
convince leaders of the importance of these behaviors. Furthermore, seeing that adjusting their 
leadership style may be challenging to some sales leaders, firms may invest into trainings that 
help leaders develop such flexibility. 
Second, leaders who lead transformationally and are able to set a good example of price 
defense are recommended to consider the aforementioned MAO factors in their personnel 
decisions. Specifically, leaders should focus on hiring salespeople who are motivated to improve 
their selling skills and perceive themselves as having a high negotiation efficacy. Moreover, 
leaders can train and coach their teams accordingly to improve their perceived ability to 
negotiate and therefore ultimately foster the adoption of price defense behavior. Thus, to 
promote salespeople’s learning motivation, leaders can create a culture that values learning and 
personal development. Such a culture might be installed through regular feedback discussions 
among leaders and salespeople to set and monitor learning goals. Promoting and creating 
awareness for a learning motivation should furthermore assume a key role in salesforce training. 
Similarly, we suggest that firms might foster salespeople’s negotiation efficacy through the 
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sharing of best practice behaviors in price negotiations. Additionally, sales leaders and their 
companies may try to influence salespeople’s perceptions about customers’ lenience, for 
example by presenting research demonstrating that price discounts are actually less important 
than salespeople think in affecting customers’ ultimate choices. 
Third, leaders who do not lead transformationally are required to carefully monitor and 
evaluate their salespeople’s price defense behavior. Our results suggest that in this case, setting 
an example to salespeople who are motivated to learn and perceive themselves as able and 
endowed with the opportunity to defend prices does not easily yield the desired effects. 
Conversely, salespeople in this case can exhibit reactance to their leaders’ role modelling 
attempts, requiring leaders to resort to other means of control. For example, leaders can use other 
leadership influence tactics, such as rational persuasion or exchange (Yukl, Seifert, and Chavez 
2008), or price defense incentives to foster their employees’ price defense behaviors. 
In addition to these implication for sales leaders, salespeople should likewise be aware 
that their current negotiation behavior is likely to be influenced by their supervisors—whether 
intended by their leaders or not. To negotiate with customers more strategically, salespeople are 
advised to proactively consult with their leaders on what intensity of price defense is required 
and then adjust their negotiation behavior accordingly. Hereby, salespeople should carefully 
reflect their own behavior and aim at implementing requested policies rather than adopting or 
rejecting their leaders’ negotiation behavior in a non-reflective manner. 
 
Limitations and avenues for future research 
Our study has several limitations that provide fruitful avenues for future research. First, our study 
does not answer the question what the right level of price defense is. Instead of adopting such a 
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normative stance, following prior literature (e.g., Wieseke, Alavi, and Habel 2014) our work is of 
explicative nature and aims to improve our understanding of the factors that factually drive 
salespeople’s price defense. Future research on salespeople’s price defense as well as managerial 
practice may benefit immensely from studies providing further guidance on which intensity of 
price defense salespeople should exhibit. As explicated before, this question is not trivial since 
price defense may exhibit ambivalent effects on desired outcomes, increasing the margin of a 
successful transaction but potentially weakening customer relationships (e.g., Dwyer, Schurr, 
and Oh 1987; Ganesan 1993; Weitz 1981; Wieseke, Alavi, and Habel 2014).  
Second, worth noting is that our study focused on one industry, that is, automobile 
dealerships. We chose this industry because of price negotiations are common in automobile 
retailing (Consumer Reports 2016) and it has therefore been examined in studies on 
salespeople’s price defense, securing our alignment with prior literature (e.g., Galinat and Müller 
1988). This being said, future studies may replicate and extend our findings in other contexts to 
establish their generalizability beyond automobile retailing. For example, it may be interesting to 
examine the role of leadership for price negotiations in a B2B field sales context. Two reasons 
suggest that in this context the effect of a leader’s on a salesperson’s intensity of price defense 
may be weaker than in automotive sales: (1) Salespeople in B2B field sales may act more 
autonomously and thus have less contact with their leaders. Thus, salespeople may be less prone 
to socially learning negotiation behaviors from their leaders. (2) Salespeople in B2B field sales 
often face professional purchasing organizations that are geared to realizing price discounts. 
Thus, in this context salespeople are more likely to face customers with lower negotiation 
lenience, which our results suggest to reduce salespeople’s adoption of their leaders’ negotiation 
behavior. 
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Third, all core constructs in our study, apart from several control factors are measured 
from salespeople’s perspective either in t=1 or t=2. However, it may be worthwhile extension to 
our model to include variables from customers’ perspective to the model such as customers’ 
factual negotiation lenience or other customer characteristics such as interaction orientation 
(McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani 2006) or loyalty (Wieseke, Alavi, and Habel 2014). Web 
Appendix 6 presents a corresponding robustness check, showing that our model also holds for a 
customer measure of negotiation lenience. Relatedly, prospective works might employ more 
comprehensive measurement of salespeople’s learning orientation and negotiation efficacy, 
addressing the limitation of our study that we measure these constructs through two two-item 
scales. 
Fourth, a limitation of our model is its indirect measurement of trade-in vehicles. 
Specifically, in automobile retailing customers may forego monetary discounts if they instead 
achieve a higher selling price for their trade-in vehicle. To take such effects into account, we 
controlled for a variable indicating whether customers demanded concessions from salespeople 
other than monetary discounts, additional equipment, or warranties. However, we acknowledge 
that this variable is not a direct measurement of the involvement of trade-in vehicles. 
Fifth, an avenue for future research pertains to the unit of analysis in the multi-level 
model. Our conceptual model comprises three levels: leader, salesperson and customer. 
However, the leadership measures were rated by salespeople and not by the leaders themselves. 
This is common practice in leadership research, though (Jaramillo and Mulki 2008; Mathieu, 
Ahearne, and Taylor 2007; Ahearne, Mathieu, and Rapp 2005; MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Rich 
2001; Shoemaker 1999; Tyagi 1985) because self-reported data of sales leaders on their own 
leadership behaviors can be biased (Gramzow et al. 2003). In this respect, future research might 
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additionally include leaders’ perceptions of their behavior in the model and investigate the 
consequences of leader–salesperson perceptual discrepancies on price negotiation outcomes (see 
Kraus et al. 2015 for a similar approach).  
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Figure 1: Overview of Relevant Research Streams for Our Study 
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Figure 2: Overview of the Conceptual Framework 
 
Notes. SP = Salesperson; the model comprises three data sources: (1) salespeople data from a one-time survey (level 2); (2) salespeople’s specific responses 
concerning one sales encounter with a customer (level1); and (3) customers’ responses concerning the specific encounter with the salesperson (level 1). t=1: First 
measurement wave, in which we conducted surveys with salespeople on components of the MAO framework and perceptions about leader behavior and style. 
t=2: Second measurement wave, in which we surveyed the salespeople from t=1 and their customers with respect to a specific sales encounter and price 
negotiation, immediately after the encounter ended.  
* As a robustness check, we aggregate salespeople’s perception of their leader’s behavior on the leader-level (level 3) and replicate our main model (see Table 3) 
** For an overview of which specific control factors we included please refer to Table 3 and the model specification section. 
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Figure 3: Three-Way Interaction Plots 
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Diagram A:
Salesperson’s Learning Motivation
Diagram B:
Salesperson’s Negotiation Efficacy
Diagram C:
Customer’s Negotiation Lenience
Note: A low (high) value of a variable refers to a value of 1.5 standard deviations below (above) the mean value.
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Table 1: Selected Literature on Social Learning in Sales Research as Conceptual Basis 
Authors Object of adoption Theory Data Key findings 
Summary and implications for 
present study 
Literature on salespeople’s adoption of sales leaders’ role modeling 
Chakrabarty, Brown, and 
Widing (2013)―JPSSM 
Customer 
orientation, adaptive 
selling 
Social learning 
theory 
Survey data from 241 salespeople 
Leaders’ customer orientation and 
adaptive selling have positive effects on 
salespeople’s customer orientation and 
adaptive selling 
 Prior literature provides evidence that 
salespeople are likely to adopt their 
leaders’ attitudes and behaviors 
 This finding is mostly explained 
through social learning theory 
 Building on this notion, in H1 we 
deduce from social learning theory 
that intensity of leader price 
defense may have a positive effect on 
intensity of salesperson price 
defense 
Homburg, Wieseke, and 
Kuehnl (2010)―JAMS 
Salesforce 
automation 
applications (SFA) 
Theory of 
informational and 
normative social 
influence 
Survey data from 22 regional 
managers, 416 sales managers, 
and 1,040 salespeople, matched 
with objective data on SFA usage 
Leaders’ usage of salesforce automation 
applications has a positive effect on 
salespeople’s usage of salesforce 
application automation 
Lam, Kraus, and Ahearne 
(2010)―JM 
Market orientation 
Social learning 
theory 
Survey data form 43 sales directors, 
285 sales managers, and 1,528 
sales representatives, matched with 
objective performance data 
Leaders’ market orientation has a positive 
effect on salespeople’s market orientation, 
especially if leaders have high 
organizational identification 
Netemeyer, Maxham, and 
Lichtenstein (2010)―JAP 
Job performance, 
job satisfaction 
Emotional 
contagion theory 
Survey data from 306 retail store 
managers, 1,615 retail store floor 
employees, and 57,656 customers, 
matched with objective performance 
data 
Leaders’ job performance and job 
satisfaction have a positive interaction 
effect on salespeople’s job performance 
Onyemah, Swain, and 
Hanna (2010)―JPSSM 
Technology usage 
Social learning 
theory 
Survey data from 81 salespeople 
Perceived technological savvy of leaders 
increases salespeople’s technology 
usage, mediated by feelings of monitoring 
and the level of perceived coworker savvy 
Wieseke, Homburg, and 
Lee (2008)―JAMS 
Brand adoption 
Social learning 
theory and theory 
of planned 
behavior 
Survey data from 156 sales 
managers and 391 sales employees 
Leaders’ brand adoption has a positive 
effect on salespeople’s brand adoption, 
especially if expected customer demand 
is low 
Literature on the role of transformational leadership for salespeople’s adoption of sales leaders’ role modeling 
Mullins and Syam 
(2014)―JPSSM 
Customer 
orientation 
Prior literature on 
transformational 
leadership 
Survey data from 197 sales 
representatives 
Transformational leadership increases 
customer orientation value congruence 
between leaders and salespeople 
 Prior literature provides evidence that 
transformational leadership 
enhances the effect of social 
learning in the leader–salesperson 
context 
 Therefore, in H2 we propose that 
salespeople are more likely to adopt 
leaders’ intensity of price defense if 
transformational leadership is high 
 However, prior literature has 
neglected that the effect of sales 
leaders’ behaviors on salespeople’s 
adoption may be contingent on 
salespeople characteristics, which 
we conceptualize in H3-H5 
Wieseke et al. (2009)―JM 
Organizational 
identification 
Social identity 
theory 
Study 1: Survey data from 36 sales 
managers and 285 sales 
representatives; study 2: Survey 
data form 22 directors, 394 sales 
managers, and 1,005 salespeople 
Leaders’ organizational identification has 
a positive effect on salespeople’s 
organizational identification, especially if 
leaders lead charismatically and have 
long dyadic tenure with salespeople 
Wieseke et al. (2011)―JSR 
Motivation to use 
service technology 
Social learning 
theory 
Survey data from 387 service unit 
managers and 1,018 customer 
service representatives, matched 
with objective company records 
Leaders’ motivation has a positive effect 
on salespeople’s motivation, especially if 
leaders lead charismatically and are of a 
similar age as salespeople 
Notes: JAMS = Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, JAP = Journal of Applied Psychology, JM = Journal of Marketing, JPSSM = Journal of Personal Selling & Sales 
Management, JSR = Journal of Service Research 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
Level 2: Salesperson                      
1. Leader’s transformational 
leadership 
                     
2. Intensity of leader price defense .06                     
3. SP’s learning motivationa .26** .05                    
4. SP’s negotiation efficacya .10 .19** .36**                   
5. SP’s experienceb  -.11 -.09 -.04 .06                  
6. Leader contingent reward .68** -.01 .27** .04 -.12                 
7. Leader contingent punishment .22** -.02 .19** .13* .08 .29**                
8. Competitive intensity .08 -.05 -.02 .01 .09 .07 -.03               
9. SP’s share of fixed compensation 
(log)b 
.04 -.02 .01 .02 .10 .02 .28** -.07              
10. SP’s share of sales commission of 
total variable compensation (log)b 
.01 .18** -.00 .11 .10 .00 .10 -.13* .37**             
11. SP’s importance of achieving profit 
goalsb 
.08 .02 .15* .12 -.05 .08 .07 -.07 -.07 -.05            
12. SP’s degree of financing contract 
quota achievementb 
-.15* .06 
-
.17** 
.06 -.03 
-
.16** 
.01 -.15* .08 .12 -.06           
13. SP’s job identification .22** -.15* .26** .05 .04 .18** .00 .15* -.02 -.11 -.01 -.01          
14. SP’s intrinsic motivation .32** .02 .21** .14* -.01 .21** -.03 -.11 -.08 .07 .12 .02 .29**         
15. SP’s empowerment .71** -.06 .33** .13* -.09 .58** .02 .17** -.03 .08 .20** -.07 .42** .46**        
Level 1: Salesperson–Customer 
Interaction 
                     
16. SP’s perceived customer 
negotiation lenience 
.05 -.01 -.04 .03 -.07 .12 .07 -.05 .06 .11 .04 .06 -.02 -.12 .00       
17. Intensity of SP price defense .04 .63** .18** .22** .03 -.02 .02 -.09 -.01 .14* .07 .21** .06 .11 .03 -.13*      
18. Customer’s realized price discount 
(log)b 
.05 .01 .02 -.06 .05 .09 .04 .07 .08 .06 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.07 .04 -.08 
-
.16** 
    
19. Customer’s price importanceb -.09 -.02 .00 -.02 -.08 -.07 .09 -.10 .08 -.03 -.03 -.03 .02 .05 -.02 .01 -.03 -.01    
20. Length of salesperson-customer 
relationshipb 
-.06 .16** .13* -.05 .25** -.06 .12 .00 .08 .08 .10 -.07 -.14* -.05 -.12 -.14* .01 .13* .02   
21. Customer alternative concession 
demandb 
-.05 .08 .05 .09 .10 -.06 .02 .02 .05 -.04 -.08 -.08 .04 .00 -.01 -.14* .05 .05 .10 .07  
Mean 5.14 4.13 6.21 5.59 12.0 5.28 5.34 4.89 2.55 1.64 6.51 .76 6.33 5.30 5.58 5.46 4.16 .94 5.39 1.38 .24 
Standard Deviation 1.25 1.45 .88 1.19 8.67 1.43 1.30 1.15 1.51 1.69 0.62 .23 .98 1.01 .99 1.55 1.22 .26 1.53 3.67 .42 
Cronbach’s Alpha .93 .93 .86 .71 -b .92 .86 .79 -
b -b -b -b .96 .68 .67 .85 .89 -
b -b -b -b 
Composite Reliability .93 .90 -a -a -b .92 .87 .82 -
b -b -b -b .95 .65 .76 .86 .89 -
b -b -b -b 
Average Variance Extracted .65 .81 -a -a -b .79 .69 .52 -
b -b -b -b .83 .33 .51 .66 .72 -
b -b -b -b 
Note: SP = Salesperson, M = mean, SD = Standard Deviation, α = Cronbach’s alpha, AVE = average variance extracted, CR = composite reliability. * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed). a Two-
item measure b Single-item measure; Cross-level correlations are based on disaggregated salesperson scores per customer–salesperson interaction (Mathieu, Ahearne, and Taylor 2007)  
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Table 3: Multi-Level Path Model Coefficients 
Independent Variables  Dependent Variables  
Main 
Effects 
Model 
Two-way 
Interactions 
Model 
Full 
Model without 
Controls 
Full 
Model with 
Controls 
Full Model: 
Three-Level 
Replication 
Main Effects       
Leader’s transformational leadershipa      SPD  n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Intensity of leader price defensea      SPD H1: + .47** .46** .37** .32** .37** 
Salesperson’s learning motivation      SPD  n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Salesperson’s negotiation efficacy      SPD  .23** .25** .17* n.s. n.s. 
Customer negotiation lenience      SPD  -.14** -.13** -.13** -.17** n.s. 
Two-way Interactive Effects       
Leader’s transformational leadership  intensity of leader price defense    SPD H2: +  .14* n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Salesperson’s learning motivation leader’s transformational leadership    SPD   n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Salesperson’s learning motivation intensity of leader price defense     SPD   n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Salesperson’s negotiation efficacy leader’s transformational leadership    SPD   n.s. n.s. .11* n.s. 
Salesperson’s negotiation efficacy intensity of leader price defense     SPD   n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Customer negotiation lenience leader’s transformational leadership     SPD   n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Customer negotiation lenience intensity of leader price defense     SPD   n.s. n.s. n.s. .07** 
Three-way Interactive Effects       
Leader’s transformational leadership  intensity of leader price defense  salesperson’s learning motivation  SPD H3: +   .11* .16* .52** 
Leader’s transformational leadership  intensity of leader price defense  salesperson’s negotiation efficacy  SPD H4: +   .08** .11** .20* 
Leader’s transformational leadership  intensity of leader price defense  customer negotiation lenience  SPD H5: +   .04* .04* .05* 
Controlled Effects       
Customer’s price importance (Level 1)        SPD     n.s. n.s. 
Length of salesperson–customer relationship (Level 1)     SPD     n.s. n.s. 
Customer alternative concession demand (Level 1)      SPD     n.s. n.s. 
Salesperson experience (Level 2)        SPD     n.s. n.s. 
Leader contingent reward (Level 2)        SPD     n.s. n.s. 
Leader contingent punishment (Level 2)       SPD     n.s. n.s. 
Competitive intensity (Level 2)        SPD     n.s. n.s. 
Share of fixed compensation (log) (Level 2)       SPD     -.17* n.s. 
Share of sales commission of total variable compensation (log) (Level 2)    SPD     n.s. n.s. 
Importance of achieving profit goals (Level 2)       SPD     .30* n.s. 
Salesperson degree of financing contract quota achievement (Level 2)    SPD     .97* .22** 
Car brand dummy (Level 2)         SPD     n.s. n.s. 
Car type dummy (Level 1)         SPD     n.s. n.s. 
Salesperson job identification (Level 2)        SPD     n.s. n.s. 
Salesperson intrinsic motivation (Level 2)       SPD     n.s. n.s. 
Salesperson empowerment (Level 2)        SPD     n.s. n.s. 
SPD (Level 1)         Realized price discount (log)  n.s. n.s. n.s. -.06* -.06* 
Customer’s price importance (Level 1)      Realized price discount (log)     n.s. n.s. 
Customer negotiation lenience (Level 1)      Realized price discount (log)     n.s. n.s. 
Length of salesperson–customer relationship (Level 1)     Realized price discount (log)     n.s. n.s. 
n.s. p > .05, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (one-tailed); unstandardized coefficients. a For the three-level replication model the variables leader’s transformational leadership and intensity of 
leader price defense are salespeople responses which are aggregated on the leader-level; SPD = Intensity of Salesperson Price Defense (t=2); Customer negotiation lenience =  
Salesperson’s perceived customer negotiation lenience.
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Appendix 
Construct Definition Items (Factor Loading ʎ) 
Measurement  
Level 
Based on 
Leader’s 
transformational 
leadership 
The degree to which a salesperson’s 
superior encourages subordinates to 
focus on long-term goals, generates 
intrinsic motivation, and inspires them to 
perform beyond expectations 
My sales manager … 
 … is very successful in inspiring me with a shared vision. (.78) 
 … can inspire me even on bad days. (.78) 
 … has a vision that he tries to achieve with creative ideas. (.81) 
 … provides inspiring strategic and organizational goals. (.90) 
 … recognizes new opportunities that may facilitate our achievement 
of organizational objectives. (.85) 
 … motivates me by articulating effectively the importance of what I 
am doing. (.87) 
 … is a convincing representative to the external public. (.61) 
SP L2 
(validated on 
SP L3*) 
Bass (1985); MacKenzie, 
Podsakoff, and Rich (2001) 
Intensity of leader price 
defense 
The degree to which a salesperson’s 
superior exhibits unyielding behavior in 
price negotiations with customers 
When negotiating price with customers, my sales manager is usually 
... 
 ... very hard (.83) 
 ... very tough (.89) 
 ... very persistent (.86) 
SP L2 
(validated on 
SP L3*) 
De Dreu and van Kleef (2004); 
Hüffmeier et al. (2014) 
Salesperson’s learning 
motivation 
The degree to which a salesperson is 
motivated to advance his or her selling 
skills 
 I am motivated to improve continuously my selling skills. (.84) 
 It is important to me to learn from every selling experience. (.92) 
SP L2 Sujan, Weitz, and Kumar (1994) 
Salesperson’s 
negotiation efficacy 
The degree to which a salesperson 
believes in his or her own ability to 
perform well and succeed in price 
negotiations vis-à-vis customers. 
A negotiation with a customer is successful for you. The reason ... 
 … does not pertain to me / … strongly pertains to mea (.90) 
 … lies within the situation / … lies within myselfa (.61) 
SP L2 Harvey and Martinko (2009) 
Salesperson’s 
perceived customer 
negotiation lenience 
The degree to which a salesperson 
perceives customers to be soft 
negotiators 
 The customer exerted pressure on me to enforce his/her discount 
claim (reverse-coded) (.84) 
 The customer uttered threats to enforce his/her discount claim. 
(reverse-coded) (.82) 
 The customer was very demanding in the price negotiation (reverse-
coded) (.78) 
SP L1 
(validated on 
C L1) 
Perdue and Summers (1991) 
Intensity of salesperson 
price defense 
The degree to which a salesperson 
exhibits unyielding behavior in a price 
negotiation with a customer 
In the price negotiation with this customer I was ... 
 ... very hard (.83) 
 ... very tough (.83) 
 ... very persistent (.89) 
SP L1 
De Dreu and van Kleef (2004); 
Hüffmeier et al. (2014) 
Realized discount 
The concession a customer receives on 
the list price of a product 
 Which discount did you receive (in percent)?b  SP L1 Wieseke, Alavi, and Habel (2014) 
Customer purchase 
intention 
Likelihood that a customer buys the 
respective car 
 It is very likely that I purchase my desired car at this dealership. C L1 Alavi, Wieseke, and Guba (2016) 
Control variables 
Customer’s price 
importance 
The role the price plays in a customer’s 
purchasing decision 
 When purchasing a car, the price is a critical decision criterion for 
me.  
C L1 
Homburg, Wieseke, and 
Bornemann (2009) 
Length of salesperson–
customer relationship 
Number of years the salesperson and the 
customers have known each other 
 For how many years have you known the customer?b C L1 Wieseke, Alavi, and Habel (2014) 
Customer alternative 
concession demand 
Customer claim for non-discount 
concessions 
 I made demands for concessions other than discounts on the car 
(Yes/no) 
C L1 Own operationalization 
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Car type dummy Type of car discussed: new vs. used  New car (0); used car (1) SP L1 Own operationalization 
Salesperson 
experience 
Number of years employed as a 
salesperson 
 For how many years have you worked as a salesperson?b SP L2 Own operationalization 
Leader contingent 
reward 
Leaders’ positive feedback to an 
employee in the case of good work 
performance 
 My sales manager gives me positive feedback when I perform well. 
(.90) 
 My sales manager commends me when I perform at high levels. 
(.88) 
 My sales manager praises me when I reach my goals. (.89) 
SP L2 Schmitz and Ganesan (2014) 
Leader contingent 
punishment 
Leaders’ negative feedback to an 
employee in the case of insufficient work 
performance 
 My sales manager tells me when I perform badly. (.71) 
 My sales manager gives me negative feedback when I do not 
perform well at a task. (.84) 
 My sales manager tells me if my productivity does not meet the 
standards. (.92) 
SP L2 Schmitz and Ganesan (2014) 
Competitive intensity 
Frequency and impact of competitive 
moves that a company faces 
 Competitors exert intense pressure on our prices. (.79) 
 Our competition makes high price concessions to customers. (.67) 
 Competitors erode the market by providing low prices. (.75) 
 We face strong pressures to make price concessions to our 
customers. (.68) 
SP L2 Jaworski and Kohli (1993) 
Share of fixed 
compensation 
Share of total compensation that is 
independent of selling performance 
 Please indicate the share of fixed compensation (in %) of your total 
compensation if you fully achieve your goals.b 
SP L2 Krafft, Albers, and Lal (2004) 
Share of sales 
commission of total 
variable compensation  
Share of total compensation that results 
from gaining a sales commission 
 Please indicate the share of sales commission (in %) of your total 
variable compensation if you fully achieve your goals.b 
SP L2 Krafft, Albers, and Lal (2004) 
Importance of achieving 
profit goals  
Perceived relevance to fulfill profit quotas 
 How important is it for you to achieve your profit goals (1 = not 
important at all / 7 = very important) 
SP L2 Colbert et al. (2008) 
Salesperson degree of 
financing contract quota 
achievement  
Degree to which a salesperson fulfilled 
monthly quota for selling financing 
contracts 
 I have achieved my monthly goal for selling financing contracts to 
____%.b 
SP L2 Own operationalization 
Car brand dummy  Car brand that the salesperson sells  Car brand 1 (0); car brand 2 (1) SP L2 Own operationalization 
Salesperson job 
identification 
Extent to which a salesperson views his 
job as an important part of his self 
 I am strongly identified with my job as a salesperson. (.95) 
 I am feeling very good being a salesperson. (.94) 
 The job as a salesperson suits me very well. (.87) 
 I feel a belonging to the group of salespeople. (.87) 
SP L2 Mael and Ashforth (1992) 
Salesperson intrinsic 
motivation 
Extent to which a salesperson views his 
selling job as self-rewarding 
 When I am doing a good job, this is due to my wish to succeed (.56) 
 I work as a salesperson, because I enjoy the work. (.38) 
 I would work as a salesperson even if I did not need the money. 
(.54) 
 I work as a salesperson because I appreciate the task of selling. 
(.76) 
SP L2 Oliver and Anderson (1994) 
Salesperson 
empowerment 
Level of autonomy granted to the 
salesperson by his sales manager 
 My sales manager allows me to do my job my own way. (.68) 
 My sales managers believes that I can do difficult tasks on my own. 
(.80) 
 My sales manager helps me understand how I can achieve firm 
goals autonomously. (.65) 
SP L2 
Ahearne, Mathieu, and Rapp 
(2005) 
SP = salesperson; C = customer; L3 = level 3; L2 = level 2; L1 = level 1; a Measured on a seven-point differential. b Measured through an open text field.  
Note: We measured all items on seven-point Likert scales anchored with “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree” unless indicated otherwise. 
* To replicate our main model as a three-level model model we aggregated salespeople’s responses of the variables leader’s transformational leadership and intensity of leader price 
defense on the leader-level (level 3), see robustness checks in the method section.  
